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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
HYDE PARK TO\Vi\, a 1nunicipal 
corporation. Ph1intitf and Appellant, 
GEORGE CHA~IBERS and TACY 
CHAMBERS. his "·ife. E. S. CHAl\IBERS, 
a single man. D.\ ,~ID J. \VEEKS, 
and ~IARY \\~EEKS. his \\·ife, 
Dele-ndant.s and Respondents. 
Respondent's Brief. 
M. C. HARRIS, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and_ .for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
HYDE PARK TOWN, a municipal 
corporation. Plamtiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
GEORGE CHAMBERS and TACl~ 
CHAMBERS, his wife, E. S. CHAMBERS, 
a single man, DAVID J. WEEKS, 
and l\IARY WEEKS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respandents. 
STATE}.IENT OF FACTS. 
The facts involved in this case are rather fully cover-
ed in the Plaintiff's brief and only one or two slight addi-
tions or contradictions are herein recorded. 
It is the contention of the defendants that even tho 
there was no express agreement that they should give up 
their culinaor streams as a part of the consideration of the 
town gran~hem these taps ,that under all the facts 
and circumsta:nces there was an implied agreement that 
as consideration for such taps the plaintiff ·could have any 
additional water that might be s~ved from the culinary 
streams of the defendants so that it is our contention that , 
the consideration for the taps was both the granting of the 
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right of way and the culinary water rights of the defend-
ants a·nd their predecessors. 
Much of the lands involved in the defendants Weeks 
case are pasture lands and hillside lands but he also culti-
vates a substantial portion of hi1s land, and all of the de-
fendant Chambers' lands are under cultivation. 
The question of the adaquacy of the water during all 
of these times is disputed, it bei·ng the contention of the 
defendants that whatever shortage there might have been 
in Hyde Park was largely the result of roots getting in the 
old pipe line and wastful practices in Hyde Park Town. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 
The primary question involved is: Did the plaintiff 
show such facts as to constitute a necessity for this con-
demnation proceeding? 
'l,he defendants .contend and the court found that the 
plaintiff already was the o\vner of the right of way sought 
to be ·condemned and, therefore, it \vas not necessary or 
proper to maintain this condemnation proceeding. 
There is therefore, involved the question of whether 
or not the plaintiff was at the time of the commencement 
of this acti~n already the owner of the right of way sought 
to be condemned. 
It is co:nceeded that at the time Hyde Park acquired 
its culinary water sy.stem (about 1910 or 1911) an oral 
contract was entered into between the town of Hyde Park 
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and the defendants 'Veeks and the predecessors in inter-
est of the defendant Chambers, whereby the defendants 
granted to the plaintiff substantially the same right of 
way as they are seeking to condemn at which time the 
town of Hyde Park granted to the defendants the rig·ht to 
tap the plaintiff's pipe line for culinary and stock water-
in~ purposes and that pursuant to the said agreement the 
town constructed the pipe line over the right of way and 
the defendants used the tap without interruption from 
approximately 1911 to 1938. 
The plaintiff claims that they do not own the right of 
way as a result of this agreement for three reasons. 
1st. That the oral agreement granting the right of 
\\-ay and the right to tap the pipe line is void for fai1ure to 
comply with the statute of frauds. 
2nd. That the said contract is void because it violates 
the constitutional provision which prohibits municipalities 
from selling their water works systems. 
3rd. That the contract is still an executory contract 
and could be terminated by either party at amy time, and 
apparently they contend that by commencing this proceed-
ing they have elected to tenninate it. 
In addition to these items the appellants charge that 
a number of the Findings were not supported by the evi-
dence. 
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ARGU'MENT. 
ASSIGNMENT No. 1. 
This action was commenced in June 1937. The Answer 
and Counterclaim was filed in April 1939 so that the as-
signment that the Findings that "plaintiff is the owner of 
culinary water which supplies the defendants with culin-
ary water" i~s clearly within the issues in this case and 
what happened after April 1939 has no bearing on the 
question. In Findings No. 20 the court expressly makes 
no findings in this action as to damages if any sustained 
by the defendants during the late spring and summer of 
1939 so that this matter is reserved for future determi~na­
tion should it arise in a proper action. 
ASSIGNMEN·T No.2. 
Assignment No. 2 complains as to t·he Findings that 
the defendant is the owner of adaquate water to supply 
both the town and these defendants through the said pipe 
line. Since this assignment goes to some important mat-
ters to be discussed later it will be necessary to examine 
the record somewhat in detain! in connection therewith. 
It should be remembered that the court also finds in Find-
ing No. 10, as follows: 
"That the Town of Hyde Park is the owner of 
1.5 c.f.s. of water in their said culinary water 
system which is sufficient to supply the 750 inhab-
itants of Hyde Park with 432 g_allons of water per 
person per day and that there are approximately 
181 families in Hyde Park using water so that there 
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is sufficient \Vater to furnish each family of four 
people 17~8 gallons per day. That 300 gallons per 
day per person is a reasonable amount of water to 
be allowed for culinary purpooes, and 1200 gallons 
per day is a reasonable amount of water to be al-
lowed to a family of four persons and that the 
Town of Hyde Park is the owner of an adequate 
supply of water for culinary purposes to supply 
the defendants \vith water for human consump-
tion and for cattle watering purposes in addition 
to an adequate supply for all culinary purposes for 
all of the inhabitants of the Town of Hyde Park 
and that the use of the water in question by the de-
fendants has not and will not seriously impair the 
use and enjoyment by the citizens of Hyde Park of 
their rights to the use of culinary water from the 
said springs. That it does not appear that the 
Town Board of Hyde Park has ever by any resolu-
tion or ordinance determined that the use of a 
small portion of its water by the defendants as 
hereafter described, has worked or will in the near 
future bring abol}.t any water shortage to said 
municipality nor its inhabitants." 
and it is apparently this finding that is attacked by As-
signments Number Two and Three. 
It is conceded that the original finding prepared by 
the court does contain the typographical or clerical error 
that Hyde Park is the owner of 1.5 c.f.s. whioh should have 
been one-half c.f.s. 
In its finding No. 15 the court found that the quantity 
of water owned by the plaintiff was one-half c.f.s. and that 
is in accordance with the pleadings and evidence so that 
the elerical error is apparent on the face of the finding 
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and, therefore, 1should be harmless. But \ve have no ob-
jection to the Supreme Court calling the matter to the 
trial court's attention and a·sking that it be corrected as a 
clerical or typographical error. 
It i~s contended in plaintiff's brief that because the 
witnesses on behalf of Hyde Park ·Town, namely the town 
officers and former water masters, testified that at times 
it was necessary to restrict the citizens of Hyde Park in 
watering their lawns to two hours per day and also that at 
times some parties living in the upper part of the town 
were short of water that this evidence necessarily should 
have been adopted by the court to find that Hyde Park was 
short of water. The reasons that the trial court probably 
declined to adopt t·his theory were not all stated by the 
trial court but some reasons that appear proper to us are 
the following: 
1. 
In the :Qr·st place the plaintiff's own testimony sho·ws 
that since the construction of the new pipe line in 1937 
there is no shortage of water. Witness Fred Duce testi-
fied as follows: (Tr. 113, Ab. 44-45) 
"Q: While you were mayor after you got this new 
system constructed was there sufficient water to furnish 
the citizens of Hyde Park culinary water? 
A: Yes, sis.,_, 
Witness Martin C. Reeder testified that there was no 
shortage of water after the construction of the new 
·.system (Tr. 173). 
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J. E. Hansen, the present water master testified on 
direct examination (Tr. 204, A b. 69) : 
"I belieYe we have plenty of water but we have no 
surplus at the present time." 
And this same witness testified that at present the 
witness Karby is using the overflow from the city reser-
voir for irrigation purposes. 
All of the testimony indicates that during at least a 
major portion of the time there was always an overflow at 
the intake of the Hyde Park water system. 
Foster Gordon also testified (Tr. 102, Ab. 42): 
"Every time I have been there they had an overflow." 
The witness Ephraim Weeks testif!ed that he always 
saw an overflow at the intake box and he also testified on 
the one occasion he went to the Hyde Park Reservoir there 
was an overflow there (Tr. 134, Ab. 51). 
The plaintiff's witness Geo. Z. Lamb who was ap-
pointed by the Town Board to negotiate this contract with 
the defendants to furnish them water for the right of way 
testified on direct· examination by Mr. Thurman as fol-
lows: That he was the mayor of the Hyde Park Board in 
1911 when the water system was constructed (Tr. 209, 
Ab. 58): 
Q: Were you water master, at all? 
A: When it was first installed, I was. 
Q:Were you water master while you were a member 
of the board? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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Q: Were you water maBter during the period of the 
distribution of the water after the pipe line had been 
completed? 
A: For a little while. 
Q: Did you make observations as to the efficiency of 
the supply at that time to take care of the needs of the 
people in Hyde Park? 
A: We had sufficient. 
Q·: You had sufficient? 
A: At that time. 
Q: Did you haye more than a sufficient? 
A: Not much. Sometimes." 
2. 
The undisputed evidence in the case indicates that 
much of the trouble was caused by the drain-pipe instal-
led in plaintiff's pipe line leading from the spring to the 
reservoir becoming clogged with roots between the intake 
and the reservoir. 
Plaintiff's wit:ne3is Kirby testified as follows (Tr. 220, 
A b. 60): 
"Q: You would go up and clean out the roots very often 
while you were water master. 
A: Yes, sir, I did." 
Plaintiff'·s witness Georpe S. Daines on direct exam-
ination testified (Tr. 262, A b. 71): 
"A: I think the pipe line must have more or less got 
clogged in places with roots. It was difficult to get the 
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water along_ the line and g'et water to the reservoir. It 
was necessary to put in the new pipe.'' 
3. 
However, the important testimony in the case which 
bears out the courfs finding is the expert testimony of en-
gineers Schaub and Clyde. 
Mr. Schaub testified (Tr. 190, Ab. 52) that under 
good engineering practice an engineer designing a culin-
ary water system for a small community of this kind 
would be satisfied with 200 gallon of water per person per 
day for culinary water system and that this takes into 
consideration all requirements for drinking, watering 
flowers, gardens, lawns, etc. 
Engineer Clyde, plaintiff's engineer, placed this 
amount at between three and four hundred gallon (Tr. 
240-241, Ab. 65) . 
On cross examination Engineer Clyde admitted that 
the co11sumption according to a table which he had sup-
plied for human consumption was 30 gallons per day per 
person and for each horse and head of cattle 10 gallons 
per day. Taking Mr. Clyde's highest figures of 40 gallons 
per day per person the daily consumption of 750 people 
would be 30,000 and allowing a liberal estimate (and it 
was only an estimate) of 2700 head of horses and cattle 
would be another 27,000 gollons or a total of 57,000 gallons 
per day for drinking and culinary purposes. 
It is admitted, both in the pleading and in the evi-
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dence, that Hyde Park Town has one-half .c.f.oS. of water 
which measured at t·he reservoir by Engineer Clyde act-
ually showed that there wa;s being delivered at the Hyde 
Park reservoir .55 c.f.8. (Tr. 252, A b. 68). One-half c.f.s. 
equals 225 gallons per minute which equals 324,000 gal-
lQns per day so that under plaintiff's engineer's own testi-
mony Hyde Park has 57,000 gallons per day for drinking 
and stock wateri·ng purposes and 267,000 gallons per day 
for irrigating and other purposes. In thi.g connection En-
gineer Clyde testified that large amount~s of water were 
required at times of fire. The undisputed evidence shows 
that the capacity of the Hyde Park reservoir is 62,000 
(Tr. 251) so that there is enough water fiowi:ng into the 
Hyde Park reservoir each day to fill it five times and it is 
submitted that any additional fire protection needed by 
Hyde Park could be easily taken care of by increasing the 
capacity of the reservoir and stopping the waste from the 
present overflovv. The undisputed evidence, therefore, 
shows that Hyde Park now has enough water to supply its 
750 citizens with 432 gallons per day. If '"e adopt the de-
fendants' expert testimony this is more than tvvice as 
much water as good engineering would require and if we 
adopt the plaintiff\s engitneer's theory of 300 g·allons per 
person per day Hyde Park has a sur~lus of 750 times 132 
or approximately 99,000 gallons per day, and if we adopt 
the 400 gallons 2~r day, which is the greatest amount the 
plaintiff's engineer would allow and is the most favorable 
testimony in the record to them, Hyde Park still has a sur-
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plus of 24,000 gallons per day, 600 gallons of which will 
supply the two tap of these defendants. 
Plaintiff,s engineer also testified by way of compar-
ison that in Logan "·here people are on meters the aver-
~o-e consumption is 150 gallons per day per person and the 
record also discloses that the usual meter arrangements is 
a minimum charge for 10,000 gallons per m01nth per 
meter or family. ·H~~de Park has approximately 51,840 
gallons per family of her people so that Hyde Park now 
has approximately five times as much water as is usually 
allowed as a minimum and the evidence in this case is that 
the average use is about one-half the minimum and it, 
therefore, seems that there is not only ample evidence to 
sustain the Finding of the court in connection with Hyde 
Park having ample water but the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence demonstrates that Hyde Park has an ex-
cess of water over any reasonable requirements for culin-
ary purposes. 
It is common knowledge that cities frequently find it 
necessary to make some restriction of hours for sprinkling 
lawns. It is elementary that public policy as applied by 
the courts must not encourage waste of water, particular-
ly water fit for culinary ~urposes. Bearing in mil)d the 
equities and all the surrounding circumstances in this case 
before this court s·hould stop these farmers from securing 
drinking water and water for culinary and stock watering 
purposes they might suggest to Hyde Park that they con-
sider ending the waste there by installing meters. 
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Defendants offered to show that similar contracts to 
to the one in question exists in many of the communities 
i:n Cache County (Tr. 182) and if this sort of practice 
were to be condemned by this court it "rould mean ruin to 
a lot of our fine farm families who are clinging to the soil 
and to rural life and producing the kind of citizenry that 
today is the countries greatest •need. 
ASSIGNMENT No.7. 
Plaintiff complains that there is no evidence to sup-
port the finding that the use of the water by the defend-
ants was adverse and under claim of right. The plaintiff 
admitted that these taps were installed by the Town of 
Hyde Park and were used continuously until the year 
1938 (Tr. 137) and both Weeks and Toolson (Chamber's 
predecessor in interest) testified that the Town granted 
them the right to the use of this water. It is contended 
that under these circum!stances the use was under a claim 
of rig·ht and that there is no evidence of any permissive 
use. 
However, if this court should be convinced that the 
Finding· as to adverse possession is not supported by the 
e-vidence, the other evidence in the case is ample to sup-
port the judgment that the plaintiff is the owner of the 
right of way and that thi>S proceeding in condemnation is 
not necessary and for that reason any finding in connec-
tion with the matter of adverse use by the defendants of 
the said waters would be harmless error even if the Sup-
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reme Court should conclude that it \vas not justified by 
the evidence: 
Butler vs. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 Pac. 869. 
Thomas Ys. Foulgar, 71 Utah 274, 264 Pac. 975. 
Plaintiff also claims that the proof is indefinite as to 
the exact amount of water used and that the judgment 
a:nd decree is so indefinite as to make the same void. 
There is evidence as to the number of cattle that both 
Weeks and Chambers customarily had on their premises, 
and there is ample evidence as to the usual amount of 
water allowed to a family for culinary and stockwatering 
purposes and the judgment in this case that these defend-
ants may not consume more than 300 gallons per day is 
sufficiently definite to prevent any waste of water and no 
cases cited by the plaintiff holds that order for a decree 
for culinary water to be sufficiently definite must define 
t·he number of people who take a drink, or the number of 
drinks (of water) a man may take in a day, or the difer-
ent size drinks that a man or a boy might take, or the 
number of cattle permitted to drink at these taps. It has 
abundantly been demonstrated heretofore that 300 gal-
lons per day will not in any way work to the material in-
jury of the Hyde Park culinary system. This limit was in-
serted in the decree altho apparently it was not in the 
original contract. Complaint is made as to the indefinit-
ness of both the contract and the decree. The words of 
Judge Wolfe in the case of Genola vs. Santaquin City, 96 
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Utah 88, Pac. (2nd) 930 constitutes a sufficient answer to 
these arguments of indefiniteness: 
"When the .contract is read in the light of the 
purposes to be accomplished, there is no indefinite-
ness. Because laymen agree on very definite pro-
pos~tions derived from the actualities of the whole 
·situation which they must deal with, these propo-
sitions do :not become less definite in actuality be-
cause lawyers have difficulty legally labeling the 
nature of the transactions or in determining the 
legal aspects of those transactions. It is but nat-
ural that each side will choose to give the trans-
actions that legal aspect which best suits its posi-
tion." 
and again at page 934: 
"Specific performance is granted by equity 
\vhen it is plain that the party should and can per-
form and refuses to do so, and injustice not reme-
diable by a money judgn1ent would otherwise re-
sult. The nature of the remedy is revealed by the 
fact that equity takes a ha,nd because the legal 
remedy is inadequate." 
Here the contract was sufficiently definite to satis-
factorilly work for twenty-eight years and surely all of 
the equities and circumstances of this case abundantly ap-
peal to the conscience of the court, that after all of these 
years the town of Hyde Park should not be permitted to 
repudiate their contract and cut off the culinary water 
supply of these defendants and resort to condemnation of 
their right of way ignoring the justice and importance of 
the matter to the defendants so that the injustice that 
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·would not only result to these individuals but to the far 
more important proposition of the injustice resulting to 
all individuals living w'ithout the corporate limits of mun-
icipalities dependent upon their water supply from the 
municipal 'vater supply would be a serious injury to far-
mers all over the state. Public policy requires that far-
~ wers owning property outside of a city limit ought to be 
permitted to utilize drinking water running past their 
door where a contract for that purpose has been made in 
good faith and we contend the public policy of the Con-
stitution was not intended to prohibit any such contract. 
The other asSignments as to the Findings being sup-
ported by the evidence are covered in later discussions. 
It is the defendants' contention that not only is there 
sufficient evidence to sustain the Findings herein but that 
the findings are made in accordance with the clear weight 
of the evidence, most of which is undisputed. 
T,HE CONTRACT TO DELIVER WATER TO THESE 
DEFENDANTS WAS VALID AND BINDING. 
It is the defendants contention that the contract i:n 
1911 was a valid and binding contract whereby the plain-
tiff secured the right to the use of the right of way as well 
as the waters saved by piping the same to the defendants 
for which the defendants secured the right to use water 
from the pipe line for culinary and stockwatering pur-
poses. It 'is likewise our contention that the contract was 
a completed contract and, therefore, has nothing to do 
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It is no more a ~contract in perpetuity than every exchange 
of property or property rights which if completed is a 
contract i:n perpetuity. 
It is likewise the defendants contention: 
1. ·That the contract was not void for the statute 
of frauds because it was not only partially per-
formed but was completed and has been acted 
upon in accordance with the completed contract 
for 28 years. 
·2. The contract was not void as a violation of 
the constitutional prohibition against municipali-
ties alienating water rights. 
a. Because it is not a contra.ct to sell or dispose of 
water ri'ghts belonging to the community but 
was a contract whereby these taps were granted 
as incidental to the plaintiff acquiring its culin-
ary water system. 
b. It was a m.ere agreement to supply water out of 
the excess water owned by the plaintiff. 
c. There is ample evidence to sustain the conten-
tion that the agreement was in fact an exchange 
of water or, that plaintiff was delivering to de-
fendants water already owned by them, the 
plaintiff to retain any water saved by reason of 
piping the old culinary streams to the defend-
ants. 
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1. 
Counsel have cited no authorities and apparently have 
not seriously argued that this contract was void because 
it was barred by the Statute of Frauds. Section 33-5-8 R. 
S. U. 1933 reads as follo"·s: 
"33-5-8. Nothing in this chapter contained shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of court to com-
pel the specific performance of agreements in case 
of part perfor~ance thereof." 
and that part performance takes a contraet out of the 
Statute of Frauds has been sustaind many times by this 
court and no attempt has been made here to exhaust the 
authorities on this subject because no authorities have 
been cited by the appellants to sustain their contention as 
to the Statute of Frauds. Two cases, however, are cited. 
Brinton vs. v.,. an Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218; 
Lynch vs. C-oviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 Pa.c. 983. 
2. 
a. It is admitted that the contract was entered into 
between these parties and fully performed by both sides 
for 27 or 28 years and it i:s our contention that in place of 
it being a contract to sell its water works and water rights 
it is a contract incidental to, and a part of, its acquiring 
its culinary water system that the granting of these two 
taps under the circumstances here was one of the inci-
dentals to securing, acquiring and installing its water 
works system and no part of any contract for Hyde Park 
to sell its water rights. 
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No case holding a similar contract to be a sale of its 
water rights is cited by plaintiff. 
A few of the many cases holding such a contract to 
be valid as i:ncidental to acquiring a water works system 
are as follows: 
Colorado Springs vs. Color~do City, 94 Pac. 316. 
Colorado Sprin£:!S agreed to furnish water to Colorado 
City a.s a part of the consideration of the right of ·way. 
They undertook to charge additional rates on the ground 
the original contract to furnish water beyond the city 
limits was ultra vires. Held they were bound by their 
contract. 
Pikes Peak vs. Colorado Springs, 44 CCA 333, 105 
Fed. 1. 
Colorado Springs granted a contractor certain rights 
to the water in consideration of his completing a tunel for 
municipal water purposes. City later undertook to repud-
iate the contract on the grounds that the contract was 
ultra vires. Held contract was binding on the City. 
Fello\vs vs. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 90 Pac. 137. 
City acquired a water system which had previously 
furnished water to plai:ntiff's lot. Held city must continue 
to ful'nish the water to the lot. The court said: 
"The water, as we have seen, was appropriated to 
a public use of which the plaintiff was and is a 
beneficiary. The city cannot thus continue to hold 
and .control property so appropriated to public use 
and at the same time refuse the public duty which 
such possession and control impose." 
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State Ex Rei, Ellenbeck vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 
361, 81 Pac. 273. 
Held that a city might exchange irrigation water for 
culinary '\vater which involves the idea that water of dif-
ferent quality mar be exchanged. 
Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake City Water and Electric 
Power Company, ~4 Utah 249, 67 Pac. 672, 25 Utah 456, 
71 Pac. 1069. 
Held that a priYate po"yer company might condemn 
the right to rse a part of the canal in the city's water 
system, and likewise held that the power company, under 
the law of appropriation, could acquire a secondary right 
to the use of the waters owner by the city. 
This is a very famous case in which the constitutional 
provision now bei·ng discussed was elaborately discussed 
by able counsel and is similar to the case at bar in the 
respect that the city first entered into an agreement with 
the power company which Vl~ later repudiated by the .city 
resulting in the litigation. When the case was first decid-
ed in February 1902 Judge Bartch speaking for the court 
said: 
"Nor do we think a secondary water right, such 
as is claimed by the power company, is inhibited 
by section 6, art. 11, of the constitution. That pro-
vision of the fundamental law prohibits the leas-
ing, selling, aliening, or di~posing of water works, 
water rights, or sources of water supply by muni-
cipalities, and doubtless was also intended as an 
i~terdiction against the power of the legislature to 
authorize municipalities to lease, sell, alien or dis-
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pose of such property; but there is nothing to indi-
cate that it was the intention of the framers of the 
constitution thereby to inhibit the acquisition of 
secondary water rights, such as the one here under 
consideration. We, therefore, regard the consti-
tutional provision above referred to as having no 
application to this case." 
Very learned counsel took part in this case. George 
L. N ye, city attorney for Salt Lake City, C. C. Richards 
and Judge J. S. Varian attacked the decision in a motion 
for rehearing, Ogden Hiles and Lindsey R. Rogers were 
on the. other side and the rehearing was granted and in the 
new opinion written Aprillst, 1905, Judge Bartch recog-
nized the importance of the decision and states that a very 
thorough examination of the law had been made by the 
court, 
"Resulting in an irresistable conclusion that the 
learned trial judge had made a decision not only 
just and w~se, as an application of the principles 
growing out of and adapted to the peculiar condi-
tions and necessities of our arid country." 
b. It is likevvise well settled under the law of this 
state that a municipality may furnish '\Vater to persons liv-
ing outside of the city limits where they have a surplus of 
water. (Statutes and authorities cited later under head-
ing "Utah Law".) Figures have heretofore been given to 
show that the municipality has always had and still has 
such a surplus ~so that upon this theory the contract to 
furnish the water is not unconstitutional but was at the 
time it was entered i~nto a valid contract. It is significa:nt 
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that for all of the years between the time the first culinary 
system was built when because of the inefficiency of the 
system, and not for lack of water, there were times when 
some citizens in the upper part of Hyde Park had difficulty 
getting ample water and it became necessary to limit the 
time for sprinkling to two hours per day no one ever 
thought of or mentioned shuttmg off the water of these 
defendants and even after the new system was built in 
Mayor Duce·s time the town continued to furnish water to 
these defendants until the election of the new officers in 
1938 when this action was brought, notwithstanding the 
fact that the evidence clearly is that the town has more 
water than a well designed water system requires so that 
upon this ground alone it is contended the judgment should 
be sustained. 
EXC·HANGE OF WATER. 
c. The record discloses that two contracts that Hyde 
Park entered into with Smithfield Irrigation Company in 
both of which contracts they exchanged 25 shares of stock 
in the Logan-Northern Canal Company, (then the Logan-
Richmond Canal Company) for waters from Birch Creek. 
The two contracts with Smithfield Irrigation Company 
are in evidence, (Tr. 293-297) In the first contract they 
agreed to pay the assessments on this water stock. In 
other words they merely turned the use of the water stock 
to Smithfield Irrigation Company for the use of the springs 
in Birch Creek. In the second contract the agreement is 
the same except that the stock was transferred to t·he 
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Smithfield Irrigation Company and they were paid 
$500.00, the interest from which was supposed to be suf-
ficient to pay the taxes on the water stock. So that if 
Hyde Park ever had acquired any additional water after 
1911 they did 'not acquire it from the Smithfield Irrigation 
Company, and the only fair inference is they acquired it 
by their conduct and in this connection the evidence in 
this case is undisputed in three particulars. 
1. That the defendants were the owners of a culinary 
water stream out of Birch Creek Canyon, used by them 
for more than twenty years prior to t·he contract and con-
·struction of the Hyde Park system. 
2. That after Hyde Park constructed its culinary 
system in 1911 these defendants abandoned that culinary 
stream. 
3. That between 1911 and 1935 at least on two occa-
sions Hyde Park undertook to use additional waters in 
Birch Creek and that finally for a conveyance back to 
Smithfield City of all of their .claims of any nature to the 
\Vaters of Birch Canyon a·nd the 'Springs therein they ac-
cepted .5 c.f.s. of water at the present spring which flow 
must be guaranteed by Smithfield Irrigation Company. 
I again repeat that the pleadings are not founded 
upon the theory of an express contract or exchange of 
water. Neither was the trial of the case upon any such 
theory. Neither did counsel attempt to induce the wit-
ness, Weeks or his wife, to testify to facts upon that theo-
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ry, but the case was brought and tried upon the theory 
that part of the consideration was express and part of it 
was implied from the conduct of the parties. The implied 
part being that H:yde Park in effect affected the saving 
between the culinary stream and the tap, and as between 
Hyde Park and Smithfield Irrigation Company and these 
defendants became the owners of the water so saved and 
this in effect amounts to an exchange of water. The fact 
that on cross-examination l\Ir. \Veeks did not expressly 
mention the giving up of the culinary stream does not 
change the fact that he did give up the stream, a fact 
which is not disputed in this case. 
PLAIXTIFF'S AUTHORITIES. 
Plaintiff cites 43 C. J. 176 and 225 for the general 
propositions that municipalities were subject to both the 
State and the Federal Constitution. Of course we have no 
quarrel with those propositions, and likewise the plaintiff 
cites a number of cases where the result ·has been reached 
that the action of the municipality officers have been ultra 
vires. \Ve do not burden the court with a desertation of 
the different facts in these cases cited for the reasons that 
they are not similar at all to the facts involved. Cases of 
ultra vires acts might be cited worlds without end but 
would be neither interesting :nor instructive to the issues 
involved in this case. 
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UTAH LAW. 
The policy of the law is not only determined by the 
constitution of the State but by the statutes and the de-
cisions of the courts. The statutes defining the policy of 
the law i,n this state for those matters are as follows: 
"Section 15-8-14. Towns may construct, main-
tain and operate water works***, and they may 
sell and deliver the surplus product or service of 
any such works, not requir.ed by the .city or it~ in-
habitants to others beyond the city limits." 
"Section 15-8-15. They may construct or auth-
orize the construction of water works within or 
without the city limits ::: * :!!" 
Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433. 
Held that money borrowed by Murray City to con-
·struct a power line outside of the city limits was a 
valid city obligation. 
In refering to the question of ultra vires the 
court states that authorities cited from Oregon and 
Washington denying municipalities the right to 
operate outside of their ·said city limits are control-
led by local statute, and our court says: 
"and in this connection it is pertinent to remark 
that perhaps no state in the Union .confers greater 
powers upon its muncipal corporations than does 
the State of Utah." 
"In view of the facts and circumstances disclos-
ed by the record in this case and the law applic-
able thereto, the court .can arrive at no other con-
clusion than that the defendant is. legally liable for 
the debt in question. The money was borrowed 
for a corporate purpose. It was profitably and 
judiciously expended, and the city and its inhabit-
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ants have already derived, and in years to come 
will continue to derive, substantial benefits there-
from. I~n these circumstances, even if the transac-
tion were not in all respects regular and in strict 
accordance \Yith law. this court does not feel auth-
orized to say that the defendant should be per-
mitted under the plea of ultra vires to escape its 
liability.·· 
The first three cases cited by counsel under the above 
heading "Tere determined, as suggested, on a state of 
facts antedating the Constitution. However, the Eller-
beck vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 361, 81 Pac. 273, and 
the case of Brummit vs. Water Works Co., 33 Utah 289, 
93 Pac. 829, were both decided after the constitutional 
provision v.-as enacted. Counsel says that constitutional 
provision in question is clear and needs no construction 
and yet it would appear significant to mean that culinary 
water could be exchanged for greater volumn of irriga-
tion water a-nd in the Brummit case the court held that it 
was proper for the city to make a contract (referred to 
as a lea-se for the purpose of the argument) where the 
city did not own sufficient water for its needs the court 
in refering to this same constitutional provision says: 
"Does the constitutional provision above quoted 
stand in the way? Our answer is again in the neg-
ative. Would it not be most forced and unreason-
able construction of the constitutional provision 
to say that it meant that a city owning a small 
quantity of water entirely insufficient for its 
public needs, say nothing of the needs of its in-
habitants, .could not make any arrangement with 
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any person to permit its water to flow through 
the pipes owned and controlled by such person 
and to distribute it for use of the city? Would it 
alter the case if such an arrangement were called 
. a lease? Does it_ not in substance amount to this? 
The city has some water but no means of distri-
bution. Some one has the means of distribution 
and an additional amount of water, vvhich, if com-
bined with what the city owns, the needs of the 
.city and its inhabitants, may be met. In order, 
therefore, to make use of the city's water, it en-
ters into an arrangement with the person owning 
and controlling the water works and the addition-
al water to permit its water to flow through the 
system ow,ned by -such person and in order to pre-
serve its title to the water the city requires the 
distributor to make a proper acknowledgment of 
this title. The mere fact that the ·city cannot say 
that the identical water owned by it is distributed 
to it in no ~ray changes the effect of the arrange-
ment. As we have already pointed out, the .city 
may exchange water for water, and this in effect 
is all that it has done in this case, and that is all 
that can in any event be done under the provis-
ions of the ordinance." 
Here is a matter it would seem somewhat analogous 
to our contention in this case that a city may acquire 
water or water works by leasing its water to be co-mingl-
ed and used vvith other privately owned waters while in 
the case at bar we have them acquiring a right of way 
together with whatever water rights they did acquire in 
the deal with these defendants as a n1ethod of acquiring 
a water works system. 
It is very significant that the constitutional provision 
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under discussion has been before the Supreme Court of 
this state in a comparatively large number of cases 'vith 
the Genola case being the last case and in every instance 
v.~ays have been found to permit the munieipalities to sup-
ply the water outside of their city limits. Not a single 
contract in connection with light or water or money bor-
rowed for that purpose has been decided against a city 
supplying these items outside the city limits. 
It must be that the Supreme Court, feeling that the 
true purpose of the constitutional provision was to pre-
vent city water supplies (essentially a public utility nec-
essary for every person in every community) from get-
ting into the hands of private ownership for distribution 
to the public and not to prevent the development of this 
arid country where good culinary water is so very scarce 
and public policy requires its conservation on every hand 
and such culinary water is just as essential to the life 
and health and development of families residing outside 
city limits as inside such communities that some way has 
been found to supply the culinary water to the persons 
outside of the towns. In the Genola case holding that 
$2500.00 in cash and stock in an irrigation company cost-
ing $3050.00 which represented water that had to be 
taken in turns and not a constant flow was water of equal 
value with 119 gallons per minute culinary water con-
stant flow, went much farther to sustain the contract 
than is necessary to go here. This in the interest of pub-
lic policy and development of the state and in no way vio-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
lating the principal that private ownership should not 
acquire public water supplies. 
We will take time, however, to briefly discuss the 
authorities cited by plaintiff from the State of Utah. 
Utah Rapid Transit Co. vs. Ogden City, 89 Utah, 546 
58 Pac. (2nd) 1. 
Held statute authorizing city to operate "Street 
Railways" did not authorize Ogden City to enter into the 
business of operating motor busses as a common carrier. 
News etc. vs. Carbon County, 72 Utah 88, 269 P. 129. 
Held county not liable for newspaper publications of 
.notice of sale of property (ordered by clerk) where the 
property wa·s property of Irrigation District and not the 
County. 
CONCLUSION. 
The judgment should he affirmed, because: 
1st. The Findings are not only supported by the evi-
dence but are in accordance with the great weight of the 
evidence most of which was undisputed. 
2nd.. The contract by which the plaintiff was the 
owner of the right of way sought to be condemned was a 
valid contract and, therefore, the plaintiff was the owner 
of the right of way sought to be condemned and the con-
demnation proceedings were entirely unnecessary be-
cause, 
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a. There was sufficient performance to take it out of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
b. Because it is not a contract to sell or dispose of water 
rights belonging to the community but was a con-
tract whereby these taps were granted as incidental 
to the plaintiff acquiring its eulinary water system. 
c. It was a mere agreement to supply water out of the ex-
cess water owned by the plaintiff. 
d. There is ample evidence to sustain the contention. that 
the agreement was in fact an exchange of water, or, 
that plaintiff was deliveri,ng to defendant water al-
ready owned by them, the plaintiff to retain any water 
saved by reason of piping the old culinary streams 
to the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. G. HARRIS, 
Attarney for Respondents. 
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